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RECENT DECISIONS
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-Omnibus Exclusion-Policy
term excluding the insured's son from liability coverage held
ineffective as against a third party injured through the son's
negligence. Abbott v. Interinsurance Exchange (Cal. 1968).
The action was brought by the insured to determine the
rights of the parties under an automobile liability policy which
had by its terms been inoperative when the insured's automo-
bile was being driven by his son. The defendant insurance
company refused a timely demand to defend the insured in
an action concerning an accident involving the insured's auto-
mobile. The automobile had been driven by the insured's son
as a permittee on the occasion. The insurer took the position
that the policy was not effective because by its terms it ex-
cluded the son by name from coverage. The California Court
of Appeals, held, public policy as expressed in the financial
responsibility sections of the California Vehicle Code requires
that an endorsement excluding omnibus coverage to an in-
sured's son be ineffective in limiting the liability of the in-
surer to innocent third parties. Abbott v. Interinsurance Ex-
change, 67 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Attempts to limit the liability of an insurer under the
omnibus clause required by California financial responsibility
laws' have been a prolific source of litigation in that state.
2
The omnibus clause has been generally regarded as a buying
incentive to aid insurance companies in selling their policies.3
California, however, has consistently held that it is a neces-
sary part of every policy of automobile liability insurance.
In Wildman v. Government Employees' Insurance Co.,4 the
leading case in California with respect to omnibus insurance
clauses, the court stated:
We are of the opinion that for an insurer to issue a
policy of insurance which does not cover an accident
which occurs when a person, other than the insured,
is driving with the permission and consent of the
1. Notes 5 & 6 infra.
2. See, e.g., Bohrn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d
497, 38 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79 (1964).
3. Castles, Coverage Under the Omnibus Clause, 56 IL. BA . J. 184
(1957).
4. 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957).
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insured is a violation of the public policy of this
state as set forth in sections 4025 and 4156 of the
Vehicle Code.7
In a rather lengthy discussion of the rule of public policy
announced in the Wildman case, the Abbott court expounded
upon the general judicial authority in the area. The insured
and the insurer, it argued, must not be allowed to reduce
premiums and liability respectively at the expense of third
parties who would thereby be denied compensation for their
injuries. In reaffirming the Wildman holding the court in
the subject case based its decision primarily on the wisdom
and necessity of the inclusion of omnibus coverage as re-
quired by section 16451 of the Vehicle Code.
Since the date of the Wildman decision, pertinent financial
responsibility and insurance sections of the California Code
had been amended. It was upon two 1963 amendments that
the appellant insurance company based its apparently sound
arguments. The court in Abbott had to consider the effect of
the new legislation on its firmly established Wildman rule.8
The first material change considered was the adoption of
section 11580.1(e) of the Insurance Code 9 which provides as
follows:
Notwithstanding the foregoing subdivisions, the in-
surer and any named insured may, by the terms of
such policy or by a separate writing, agree that cov-
erage under the policy shall not apply while said
motor vehicles are being used by a natural person
or persons designated by name. Such agreement by
any named insured shall be binding upon every in-
sured to whom such policy applies.' 0
5. Now CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17150 (West 1959), as amended, (Supp.
1967). This section makes the owner of the automobile liable for damages
caused by the negligence of any person driving it with his express or im-
plied consent.
6. NOW, CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16451 (West 1959), as amended, (Supp.
1967). This section provides in part:
An owner's policy of liability insurance shall insure the person
named therein and any other person, as insured, using any owned
motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of said as-
sured ....
7. 48 Cal. 2d at 39, 307 P.2d at 364.
8. Wildman has been cited as controlling in at least 18 cases to date.
9. West Supp. 1967.
10. It is of interest to note that during the 1968 session of the South
Carolina General Assembly an identical bill was introduced in the House
of Representatives as a proposed amendment to section 46-750.11 (3) (c)
of the 1962 Code. That bill (Calendar No. H 2612) was continued by a
substantial vote.
[Vol. 20
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In answering the insurer's contention that the policy con-
formed with section 11580.1 (e), the court was somewhat less
than lucid. It quoted from two recent California decisions
which were not concerned with subsection (e) of the act.
Uber v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co."i considered the prob-
lem of ownership after an irregular transfer of title to the
insured vehicle, and Clark v. Universal Underwriters Insur-
ance Co.12 dealt with an attempted restriction of liability cov-
erage to a named group rather than exclusion of a named
individual from coverage. These cases noted that the purpose
of subdivision (d) I of section 11580.1 was to expand insur-
ance coverage to protect the public.14 These cases were not,
however, authority for disregarding subsection (e), since it
appears that the purpose of subsection (e) could have been
only to limit subsection (d) in the stated situation. An earlier
case15 arising from facts similar to those in the subject case,
but occurring prior to the effective date of the 1963 amend-
ment to the section, gave cursory consideration to that amend-
ment. By explaining that the 1963 amendment was not re-
troactive and so not to be considered, the court indicated that
the rule in the WiIdman case might have been changed to make
future exclusions by name effective. The court here, quoting
the Uber and Clark cases without further explanation or au-
thority, dismissed that possibility and reduced subsection (e)
to virtual insignificance.
The second argument which the court considered was that
under section 16450 of the Vehicle Code, as amended, the
financial responsibility laws did not apply to the policy in
question because it had not been certified as proof of financial
responsibility. Section 16450 now provides as follows:
A "motor vehicle liability policy," as used in chapters
2, 3 and 4 of this division, means an owner's policy
or an operator's policy, or both, of liability insur-
11. 247 Cal. App. 2d 611, 55 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1967).
12. 233 Cal. App. 2d 746, 43 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1965).
13. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1(d) (West Supp. 1967) provides that all
insurance policies shall contain a
provision insuring the insured named therein and to the same
extent that coverage is afforded such named insured in respect
to said described motor vehicles, any person using, or legally
responsible for the use of, said motor vehicles, provided the
motor vehicles are being used by the named insured or with his
permission, express or implied.
14. 247 Cal. App. 2d at 616-17, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
15. Bohrn v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 497, 38
Cal. Rptr. 77 (1964).
19681
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ance, certified as provided in Section 16431 as proof
of ability to respond in damages, issued by an in-
surance carrier authorized to transact such business
in this State to or for the benefit of the person
named therein as assured. Any requirements set
forth in said chapters 2, 3 and 4 relating to a motor
vehicle liability policy shall apply only to those
policies which have been certified as proof of abil-
ity to respond in damages as provided in Section
16431.16
The second sentence of the above section was added in 1963.
Appellant argued from this section that section 16451 of
the Vehicle Code17 did not apply unless the policy had been
certified as proof of financial responsibility. Therefore, the
subject policy was not governed by the requirements of sec-
tion 16451 of the Vehicle Code but only by the require-
ments of section 11580.1 of the Insurance Code which it met
and which allowed the exclusion of a named party.
The argument that financial responsibility laws do not
regulate policies which have not been certified as proof of
responsibility has generally prevailed in those jurisdictions
which have had occasion to consider it.1s In those jurisdic-
tions which accepted the above argument, the result was that
every dog was entitled to one bite. Consequently, the legisla-
tion was quite ineffective in assuring compensation to in-
jured parties. 10
Immediately after the Wildman decision, the California
Legislature amended the section requiring omnibus coverage
by adding the phrase, "certified as provided in section 414
as proof of ability to respond in damages," to the definition
of the "policy" to which the section applied. In American
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of Amer-
16. West Supp. 1967.
17. This provision is quoted in note 6 supra.
18. E.g., Johnson v. Universal Auto Ins. Ass'n, 124 So. 2d 580, 583-84
(La. Ct. App. 1960); Barkdey v. International Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 38,
86 S.E.2d 602 (1955); Stillwell v. Iowa Natl Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 588,
139 S.E.2d 72 (1964); see Comment, Ability of Insurer to Limit Persons
Covered by Motor Vehicle Liability Policy, 34 CAL. L. REV. 209, 215 (1961).
Since 1963, omnibus coverage has been a necessary part of every policy
of automobile liability insurance issued in South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 46-750.31 and 46-750.32 (Supp. 1967).
19. See Note, Legislative and Judicial Assistance to Automobile Acci-
dent Victims-Compulsory Insurance, Financial Responsibility Laws and
Automobile Accident Compensation, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 126 (1938); Note,
New Approach to Problem of Motorist Financial Responsibility Misses
Mark, 1 STAN. L. REv. 263 (1949).
[Vol. 20
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ijC, 20 the court indicated by dictum that the policy announced
in the Wildman case had been changed, saying of the 1957
amendment:
It makes a material change in the phraseology of the
section, and such a change is ordinarily viewed as
showing an intention on the part of the Legislature
to change the meaning of the provision rather than
interpret it.21
However, in a subsequent case22 it was held that the 1957
amendment had in no way changed the requirement that
every policy, regardless of whether it had been certified as
proof of financial responsibility, provide coverage to permis-
sive users. In that opinion the court stated: "It is difficult
to believe that the Legislature intended to change the far
reaching effect of Wildman in such an oblique, confusing and
ambiguous fashion. '2 3 The interpretation given the similar
1963 amendment in the principal case was clearly consistent
with this statement. The present court has taken the posi-
tion that the 1963 amendment to section 16450 was intended
"9solely to refer to one means of proof of the liability of the
owner of a car to respond in damages. ' 24 Though the reader
of this opinion may have been unable to discover any sig-
nificance in the amendment as so interpreted, he did know
beyond question that California's financial responsibility leg-
islation and the party injured by a permissive user of an
automobile had a staunch supporter in this court. Though
the court was vague in its statement of the effect of the
amendment, if any, it made very clear that it had not changed
the rule of the Wildman case.
The writer awaits with interest final resolution of the
question raised by this case from California's highest court.
That decision will be of substantial importance in the de-
velopment of California's financial responsibility law and of
considerable interest in other jurisdictions as they deal with
the nationwide problem of providing compensation to auto-
mobile accident victims.
JAMES A. SPRUILL
20. 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341 P.2d 675 (1959).
21. Id., 341 P.2d at 677.
22. Interinsurance Exch. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142, 373 P.2d
640, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1962).
23. Id., 373 P.2d at 645, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
24. Abbott v. Interinsurance Exch., 67 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (Dist. Ct. App.
1968).
1968]
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Poisoned Fruits Doctrine-Sup-
pression of tangible evidence and testimony relating to such
evidence as poisoned fruits of a coerced confession. Dowlut
v. State (Ind. 1968).
The appellant was arrested on April 15, 1968, and taken to
the police station for questioning. Without being advised of
his constitutional rights and after being refused the right to
call an attorney, he was subjected to a paraffin test' and to
interrogation at various intervals. On April 17, the appellant
signed statements which were dictated by police and then
took officers to a cemetery where a buried gun was recovered.
Until the appellant's initial appearance in city court on April
17, no charge had been filed against him, and he had not
been advised of his rights. At the trial the coerced con-
fessions were properly suppressed from evidence,2 but the
appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree in
the Circuit Court of La Grange County. The conviction was
based on the physical evidence of, and the testimony relating
to, the gun, bullets, and paraffin test. On appeal the Supreme
Court of Indiana, held, reversed and remanded. Tangible
objects and noncommunicative evidence obtained as the result
of an illegal confession, as well as testimony relating to such
evidence, are inadmissable under the poisoned fruits doctrine,
when not supported by independently established evidence.
Dowlut v. State, 235 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1968).
As early as 1914 in Weeks v. United States,s the United
States Supreme Court held that in a federal prosecution the
fourth amendment barred the use of tangible evidence se-
cured through an illegal search and seizure. This case became
the basis for the exclusionary rule, which, after some contro-
versy,4 was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.5 In its dis-
cussion of Mapp, found in Linkletter v. Walker,6 the Court
1. A paraffin test is used to disclose the presence of powder on the
hand of one who is suspected of having recently discharged a firearm.
However, the Indiana court does not make any distinction between the
results of this noncommunicative test and the other evidence sought to be
suppressed. It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court
in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), has allowed the results
of similar noncommunicative test to be introduced into evidence. In
Schmerber the results of a blood test taken against the will of the defend-
ant were admitted although the defendant argued that this violated his
right against self-incrimination.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
5. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. 381 U.S. 618, 633-37 (1965).
[Vol. 20
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stated that the exclusionary rule and the Mcpp decision were
not so much aimed at the unreliability of illegally obtained evi-
dence as they were aimed at the regulation of police practice.7
Excluding this illegally gained evidence seemed to be the only
practical means of discouraging law-enforcement officers
from perpetrating such illegal searches and seizures.
Once law-enforcement officers were denied the use of such
illegally obtained evidence in court, it was a natural and
necessary development to exclude other facts and materials
gained through the use of this illegal evidence. Such evidence
was excluded under the "fruits of the poisonous tree doc-
trine," which was set out in Nardone v. United States and
Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States.8 At this
point it is important to note that although Silverthorne ap-
plied the fruits doctrine to illegal search and seizure, and
Nardone extended it to cover illegal wire taps, this derivative
evidence theory has not yet been extended by the United States
Supreme Court to cover the fruits "of an illegal confession
which had been excluded because of coercion. 9
Prior to Dowlut, the cases in Indiana would seem to have
followed the decisions of the majority of other jurisdictions in
allowing admission of tangible evidence derived from an in-
admissible confession. 0 Many legal writers in this field seem
to feel that in most instances such evidence is admissible.1
There is authority as well for the proposition that even those
7. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Tehan v. United
States, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966).
8. 308 U.S. 338 (1939); 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In the Nardone case the
Supreme Court dealt with evidence which had been gained from an illegal
wire tap. The court said that not only should the intercepted telephone con-
versation be excluded but all evidence gained as a result of such a conver-
sation should also be excluded as poisoned fruit. In Silverthorne the Su-
preme Court held that all evidence and knowledge gained as a result of an
illegal search and seizure could not be used. All such evidence and knowl-
edge was poisoned fruit of the illegal search.
9. See ALI MODEL CODE OF PPE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 9.09 Com-
mentary (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
10. Compare McCoy v. State, 241 Ind. 104, 170 N.E.2d 43 (1960), and
Watts v. State, 229 Ind. 80, 95 N.E.2d 570 (1950), with Rusher v. State,
94 Ga. 363, 21 S.E. 593 (1894); State v. Moran, 131 Iowa 645, 109 N.W.
187 (1906); State v. Turner, 82 Kan. 787, 109 P. 654 (1910); State v.
Lowry, 170 N.C. 730, 87 S.E. 62 (1915), and State v. Middleton, 69 S.C. 72,
48 S.E. 35 (1904).
11. 1 S. GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 231-32 (16th ed. 1899); 2
H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENcE § 404 (5th ed. 1956); 2 F. WHARTON,
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 600 (11th ed. 1935). See also 29 AIM.
JuR. 2d EVIDENCE § 531 (1939); Kamisar, Illegal Searches and Seizures
and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements; A Diologue on a Neg-
lected Area of Criminal Procedure, 78 ILL. L.F. 95 (1961).
19681
7
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SoUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
portions of the illegal confession dealing with tangible evi-
dence can under certain circumstances be admitted.
12
In State v. Turner's the Kansas court set out very thor-
oughly the older theory supporting such admission. Quoting
from Underhill on Criminal Evidence 4 the court stated:
The main reason for rejecting confessions uttered
under the influence of hope or fear is the great
probability that the prisoner has been influenced by
his expectation of punishment, or of immunity, to
speak what is not true. If, however, the existence of
extraneous fact is discovered through the statements
of the accused, no reason exists for rejecting those
parts of the confession which led to the discovery,
and which, though not voluntarily made, have been
corroborated convincingly by the facts discovered.' 5
The key issue in this line of cases was the reliability of the
tangible evidence as distinguished from less reliable com-
municative evidence.', Even those portions of the coerced
confessions which were substantiated by extraneous facts
were felt to be reliable under this older theory.' 7  Since
Miranda, however, reliability is no longer a central concern.
The effect of the Dowlut decision would seem to be to rule
out completely all evidence which is discovered as the result
of a coerced confession. If such is the case, police in Indiana
would have little to gain by obtaining such coerced confes-
sions.
This decision joins such police regulation oriented cases as
United States v. Wade and Mapp v. Ohio. It would extend
the poisoned fruit doctrine past Nardone and Silverthorne.
The significance of this decision is to extend the poisoned
fruit doctrine in Indiana into a new field, that of coerced
12. E.g., State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 41 A. 820 (1898); Rusher v.
State 94 Ga 363, 21 S.E. 593 (1894); Banks v. State, 84 Ala. 430, 4 So.
382 (1888). See generally 2 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 404
(5th ed. 1956); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 831 (1961).
13. 82 Kan. 787, 109 P. 654 (1910). The South Carolina case of State v.
Middleton, 69 S.C. 72, 48 S.E. 35 (1904) is directly in point and represents
the older view overturned by Dowlut.
14. H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 138 (2d ed. 1910).
15. State v. Turner, 82 Kan. 787, 109 P. 654, 655 (1910).
16. In earlier cases of coerced confessions, the reliability test played an
important part. See State v. Cocklin, 109 Vt. 207, 194 A. 378 (1937);
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 227, 244 S.W. 681 (1922).
17. Cases and authority cited supra note 12.
[Vol. 20862
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss5/7
1968] RECENT DECISIONS 863
confessions. At such time as the Supreme Court does deal
with this question, it seems highly probable that it will sup-
port the Indiana court and follow its own developing trend,
excluding such evidence gained from a coerced confession as
poisoned fruit.
J. MUNFORD SCOTT, JR.
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REAL PROPERTY-Implied Warranties-In sale of resi-
dential real estate, no implied warranty that fixtures fit for
intended use. Frasher v. Cofer (S.C. 1968).
The plaintiff purchased a house from the defendant which
contained, as one of the fixtures, a heating system. There-
after, when the plaintiff had the heating system serviced, it
was found to be defective and unfit for use. Ultimately, it
had to be replaced. The plaintiff brought suit seeking to
recover the cost of replacement from the defendant-vendor
on the theory that the vendor had impliedly warranted the
heating system to be fit and proper for its intended use. The
circuit court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the com-
plaint. On appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina, held,
affirmed. In the sale of residential real estate, there is no
implied warranty that fixtures will be fit for their intended
use. Frasher v. Cofer, 160 S.E.2d 560 (S.C. 1968).
In most jurisdictions the rule of caveat emptor, though al-
most abandoned as regards chattels, still lingers with respect
to the sale of realty.' In South Carolina, the court long ago
rejected caveat emptor in favor of the civil doctrine that
"a sound price requires a sound commodity." 2 Yet, as in
other jurisdictions, the court has not seen fit to extend the
doctrine of implied warranty to the sale of realty.3 The
South Carolina Supreme Court has stated that "[in the sale
of lands there is certainly no implied warranty as there may
be in reference to personalty. . . . A purchaser must pro-
tect himself, if at all, by covenants in writing . . .4
In Frasher the plaintiff contended that precedents relied
upon in establishing the rule against implied warranties in
the sale of real estate were applicable only to the vendor's
title and not to the condition of the realty. In this respect,
Frasher presented a novel question. The court, however, re-
jected this distinction stating that none of these decisions was
intended to be so limited and thereby refused to recognize
any implied warranty of fitness of any heating apparatus
1. Bearnian, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon
the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961).
2. E.g., Stevenson v. Kirkland Seed Co., 176 S.C. 345, 180 S.E. 197
(1935); Barnard v. Yates, 1 Nott & McC. 142 (S.C. 1818).
3. Latimer v. Wharton, 41 S.C. 508, 19 S.E. 855 (1894); Mitchell v.
Pinckney, 13 S.C. 203 (1879); Rogers v. Horn, 6 Rich. Eq. 361 (S.C.
1853); Rupart v. Dunn, 1 Rich. 101 (S.C. 1844) ; Evans v. Dendy, 2 Speers
9 (S.. 1843).
4. Lessly v. Bowie, 27 S.C. 193, 197, 3 S.E. 199, 200 (1887).
[Vol. 20
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or other fixture included in the sale of a residence., Similar
results have been reached by other jurisdictions. Williston,
likewise, concludes that "generally there is no implied war-
ranty of quality or condition implied in the sale of real es-
tate .... -7
The Frasher decision does not, however, totally relieve the
vendor of liability for defects in the realty, for if the pur-
chaser can show fraud or misrepresentation on the part of
the vendor, he may recover damages in tort. In all of the
cases cited by the court as establishing the rule against im-
plied warranties in the 'sale of realty, fraud and misrep-
resentation were recognized exceptions to the general rule
of nonliability.8
Ultimately, the Frasher decision may become most note-
worthy for its suggestion of a new implied warranty theory
upon which a vendor might be held liable for defects in the
condition of real estate. The court acknowledged that the
general rule of no implied warranty has been the subject of
much criticism.9 This is especially true in the area of new
housing when the vendor is also the builder. When this sit-
uation exists, the trend has been to find an implied warranty
of fitness.
Implied warranties emerged during the time when mass
production was drastically altering the personal nature of the
buyer-seller relationship. As a consequence, the commercial
doctrine of implied warranty was developed to provide a min-
imum standard of quality as a protection for the consumer.
This new warranty doctrine was understandably rejected
when attempts were made to apply it to real estate purchases,
for the courts still believed that buyers of real property were
adequately protected by rights of inspection and by the op-
portunity to negotiate express warranties.10 However, the
5. 160 S.E.2d at 561.
6. In the absence of express warranty "there is no implied warranty as
to condition of real estate . . . ." Kerr v. Parsons, 83 Ohio App. 204, 82
N.E.2d 303, 305 (1948). See also Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Cross, 212 Md. 402,
129 A.2d 518 (1957) ; Berger v. Burkoff, 200 Md. 561, 92 A.2d 378 (1952) ;
Levy v. Young Constr. Co., 26 N.J. 330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958) ; Shapirio v.
Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955).
7. 7 S. WUISTON, CONTRACTS § 926 (W. Jaeger ed. 1963).
8. Latimer v. Wharton, 41 S.C. 508, 19 S.E. 855 (1894); Lessly v.
Bowie, 27 S.C. 193, 3 S.E. 199 (1887); Mitchell v. Pinckney, 13 S.C. 203
(1879); Rogers v. Horn, 6 Rich. Eq. 361 (S.C. 1853); Rupart v. Dunn, 1
Rich. 101 (S.C. 1844).
9. 160 S.E.2d at 561.
10. Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of
Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633 (1965).
1968]
11
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
proponents of this new trend do not see the builder-vendor
situation as a conflict between real estate and commercial
law. They see, rather, an integration of the two fields of
law forced upon the courts by the "housing merchant" who
has given the modern house the characteristics of a manu-
factured article."
The rationale underlying the builder-vendor theory of im-
plied warranty is the consequence of a burgeoning construc-
tion industry,12 which has resulted in the growth of the large
residential builder, who by selling his own product holds him-
self out as an expert. Since the ordinary purchaser lacks suf-
ficient familiarity with building construction to make- a
knowledgeable inspection, the purchaser should be able to
rely on the skill of the builder.'3 When a "person holds him-
self out as specifically qualified to perform work of a par-
ticular character, there is an implied warranty that the work
which he undertakes shall be of proper workmanship and
reasonable fitness for its intended use . . "I' Faced with
the specter of an uninformed buyer placed at the mercy of
the "housing merchant," the courts which have dealt con-
scientiously with the problem have imposed implied warranty
liability upon the builder-vendor as a necessary extention of
the law of implied warranty of chattels. The courts have thus
recognized that "the sale of new housing . . . has lost the
mistique which once justified the use of a special body of
law."'15
In South Carolina the builder-vendor theory of implied war-
ranty has never been tested, but some insight into how the
court might deal with such a contingency may be gained from
the recent decision of Rogers v. Scyphers.'6 This was a per-
sonal injury case in which the plaintiff sued the builder-
vendor for personal injuries sustained as a result of defective
11. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Mer-
chant Did It, 52 CORNErL L.Q. 835 (1967).
12. Recently, "tight money" has limited the number of prospective pur-
chasers and therefore the current demand for housing is down. The Viet-
nam War and the inflation have also seriously limited building investment.
However, if these situations terminate at once the demand for housing
would gTeatly exceed the supply, resulting in a favorable climate for the
builder. 18 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 706 (1967).
13. Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of New Houses, 26 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 862 (1965).
14. Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 271, 64 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1967).
15. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Mer-
chant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 863 (1967).
16. 161 S.E.2d 81 (S.C. 1968).
[Vol. 20
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss5/7
RECENT DECISIONS
construction caused by the builder's negligence.17 Although
recovery was not based upon implied warranty, the court
recognized that the trend of the law in the field of real
property is to predicate liability upon the theory of implied
warranty if the builder-vendor relationship exists.18
In Frasher the court suggested that if it were to accept
the builder-vendor theory of implied warranty, it would not
be impeded by the holdings in Lessly v. Bowie"9 and other
cases which seemingly left fraud and misrepresentation as
the only means of recovery for any defects in realty pur-
chased:
To hold the builder-vendor of a new house liable,
whether for personal injury or for property damage,
where the circumstances of the transaction are such
as to warrant the inference that his failure to dis-
close the defect was tantamount to fraud or mis-
representation, would seem not inconsistent with the
exceptions to the rule against implied warranty noted
in Lessy .... 20
The Rogers and Frasher decisions indicate that the builder-
vendor theory of implied warranty is still an open question
in this state, but it probably will be accepted if the court
is presented a sufficient complaint. To qualify under this
theory the complaint must allege that the house was new,
that it was built by the vendor, and that the claimed defect
was or should have been known to the vendor.2' However,
since the complaint in Frasher did not allege such facts, the
complaint was insufficient to warrant consideration of this
new theory; and since it stated facts from which neither fraud
nor misrepresentation could be inferred, the plaintiff was de-
nied recovery. The plaintiff sought recovery solely on the
theory of implied warranty; in residential real estate in South
Carolina there is definitely no implied warranty that the
fixtures included as part of the sale will be fit for their in-
tended use.
LEGARE WALxER, MI
17. Amnot., 8 A.L.R.2d 200, 213 (1949).
18. 161 S.E.2d at 83.
19. 27 S.C. 193, 3 S.E. 199 (1887).
20. 160 S.E.2d at 561.
21. Id. at 561-62.
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REAL PROPERTY-Liability of Builder-Vendor After Con-
veyance-Builder-vendor of new houses liable in tort for neg-
ligent construction, not only to purchaser, but to third parties.
Rogers v. Scyphers (S.C. 1968).
The defendants, who were engaged in building and selling
new houses, conveyed a new house to the plaintiff's husband
after assuring him the house was properly constructed. Ap-
proximately one year after the sale, the plaintiff was injured
when the folding stairway she was climbing collapsed. The
complaint alleged, inter alia, that the defendant was negligent
in building and selling a residence in which the folding stair-
way was negligently installed.' The defendants demurred on
the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the defend-
ant appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina, held, affirmed. The tort liability of a builder-vendor of
new houses for negligent construction continues after accept-
ance, not only as to the purchaser, but to third parties who
could be expected to occupy the house. Rogers v. Scyphers,
161 S.E.2d 81 (S.C. 1968).
1. Tort Liability
Before Rogers, the South Carolina court had followed the
view, adopted in many jurisdictions, that the vendor was not
liable for injuries to third parties occurring after the com-
pleted work had been accepted. 2 The reasoning developed to
support non-liability was based on the traditional concept of
lack of privity5
The lack of privity theory was buried long ago in the field
of chattels by the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.4 The MacPherson rule was quickly accepted,5 but for some
reason, there was a general reluctance to apply it in cases
involving the sale of real estate.6 Essentially, the MacPherson
rule is that when a person enters upon an affirmative course
1. It was alleged that the defendant was negligent in installing the
folding stairway by merely attaching it to the molding, rather than bolting
or otherwise properly securing the stairway to a joint.
2. Clyde v. Summerel, 233 S.C. 228, 104 S.E.2d 392 (1958), criticized in
12 S.C.L.Q. 604 (1960).
3. See Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 191 (1950).
4. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
5. MacPherson "is the universal law in the United States." W. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964). See, e.g., Salladin
v. Tellis, 247 S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d 875 (1966).
6. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (3d ed. 1964).
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of conduct for his own benefit which may affect the interests
of others, the mere presence of a contract should not negate
the existance of a tort duty to those not party to that con-
tract.7 Cardozo's reasoning, in finding that a manufacturer
of a chattel was liable in tort for his negligence to those not
in privity of contract with the manufacturer, is equally ap-
plicable to cases involving the sale of real estate. The de-
cided trend now is to apply MacPherson to realty and to hold
the builder-vendor liable for negligent construction to all per-
sons who could reasonably be expected to occupy the premises.
South Carolina through Rogers, joins that trend.8
The Rogers court, in extending the MctcPherson doctrine to
cover certain real property transactions, reasoned that there
was "no rational difference between the duty owed by the
manufacturer of a chattel and the duty owed by the builder-
vendor of a new structure."9 Therefore, at least so far as
the sale of new homes is concerned, the court abandoned the
classic privity of contract rule, which had isolated builders and
manufacturers from liability to ultimate users and consumers.
Thus, building contractors will be treated like all other in-
dependent contractors, manufacturers, and vendors in regard
to negligently manufactured products which cause injuries.10
7. Id.
8. In Rogers the court stated that liability could also be found on the
theories of implied warranty (to be discussed infra) and on the following
Restatement of Torts position:
A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee
any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves un-
reasonable risk to persons on the land, is subject to liability to
the vendee and others upon the land with the consent of the
vendee or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the condi-
tion after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know the con-
dition of the risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition,
and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to
believe that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize
the risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).
9. 161 S.E.2d at 84.
10. This means the builder-vendor now has the duty to use "reasonable
care" to avoid "unreasonable risks" not only to the purchaser, but also
to those who would normally be expected to occupy the house. The con-
tractor will not be held strictly liable, just as the MacPherson doctrine
did not hold the manufacturer of chattels strictly liable. Rather, it will
simply make the builder-vendor liable for his own negligence. See 27 AM.
Jun. Independent Contractor § 55 (Supp. 1968); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 893
(19598); 12 S.C.L.Q. 604 (1960). No mention was made in Rogers of how
long after acceptance the vendor will be subject to liability. Presumably,
South Carolina will follow other jurisdictions on this point and determine
the length of time by a standard of reasonableness. E.g., Hanna v.
Flectcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
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II. Implied Warranty
The Rogers court was explicit in pointing out that the
theory of implied warranty" in the sale of real property
was not in issue since the plaintiff did not seek to recover on
that theory. Yet the conclusion may be reached from reading
the opinion that the court might accept this theory of liability
were it presented in the proper case.' 2 Several cases decided
in other jurisdictions and cited in the opinion were predicated
on the theory of implied warranty'3-"simply to show the
trend of the law in this field." One of these cases' 4 had facts
very similar to Rogers v. Scyphers in that the vendee was in-
jured when the stairway in her new house collapsed. Borrow-
ing the reasoning from that case, the South Carolina court
stated:
The ordinary purchaser is not in a position to dis-
cover a latent defect by inspection, no matter how
thorough his scrutiny may be, because usually he
lacks sufficient familiarity with the complexities of
building construction and the intricacies of applicable
regulations. He should be able to rely on the skill of
the vendor who sells the house to him. Otherwise he
would be at the vendor's mercy.'5
11. See Latimer v. Wharten, 41 S.C. 508, 19 S.E. 855 (1893); Annot.,
8 A.L.R.2d 218 (1950).
12. In Frasher v. Cofer, 160 S.E.2d 560 (S.C. 1968), decided the day
before Rogers v. Scyphers, the plaintiff sued on the theory of implied war-
ranty to recover the cost of replacing the defective heating system in the
house she had purchased from the defendant. The court held that the plain-
tiff had failed to state a cause of action. Among the reasons for sustain-
ing the defendant's demurrer was that the complaint did not allege the
house was new or that the defendant had built it. Had these facts been
alleged, presumably the court would have ruled differently. Therefore, it
seems clear that the court is only considering implied warranty in realty
when the house involved was either new when sold to purchaser or else
built by the vendor, or both.
13. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) ; Glisan v.
Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
44 N.3. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Co., 154
N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705
(1961).
14. Caporaletti v. A.-F. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1965), rev'd on
other grounds, 240 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
15. 161 S.E.2d at 84. A strong reason for imposing liability on the vendor
of real property on the ground of implied warranty is that consumers of
this era have come to rely on implied warranty of fitness in almost every-
thing they purchase.
The old rule of caveat emptor does not satisfy the demand of
justice in such cases. The purchase of a home is not an everyday
transaction for the average family, and in many instances it is
the most important transaction of a lifetime. To apply the rule
[Vol. 20
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The theory that there was no implied warranty in realty
developed when the vendor and the purchaser were on equal
bargaining terms.16 Now, however, this equality of bargain-
ing position no longer exists. Houses have become so compli-
cated that everyday purchasers cannot hope to extract ex-
press written warranties on every part of a house without
the warranty being so vague and general as to be difficult to
enforce. 7 Consequently, the most logical method of protect-
ing the purchaser is through the theory of implied warranty.'-8
This theory has been accepted by all jurisdictions for many
years in the field of chattels, and as the South Carolina court
has stated that there is no logical difference between the pur-
chasers of chattels and the vendees of real property. Of course,
to allow a future plaintiff to prevail on the theory of implied
warranty in realty would necessarily mean a departure from
the present law, but it would seem that the court is not so
bound by stare decisis that it cannot modify its position to
adjust to changing conditions.
III. Conclusion
It is possible that the supreme court will use Rogers as a
springboard for approving implied warranty as a theory of
liability in future cases. But whether the court extends the
liability of the builder-vendors of new houses to cases arising
under implied warranty or simply continues to hold them
liable in tort, this case must remain as one of the most im-
portant real property cases of recent vintage. It will put
builder-vendors on notice that they can no longer negligently
construct houses and buildings and hide behind the lack of
privity for protection from their negligence.
RAY D. LATHAN
of caveat emptor to an inexperienced buyer, and in favor of a
builder who is daily engaged in the business of building and
selling houses, is manifestly a denial of justice.
Bethlahmny v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (Idaho 1966).
16. For an excellent discussion of this topic see Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
17. Such a warranty would necessarily have to be stated in terms such
as "quality house" or, as here, an assurance that the house was properly
constructed.
18. It is interesting that South Carolina was the first jurisdiction to
apply the theory of implied warranty in chattels. The court stated "that
a sound price required a sound commodity." Timrod v. Schoolbred, 1 Bay
324 (S.C. 1793). See Figg, Of Carolina Quiddities, Quillets and Cases, 18
S.C.L. Rav. 719 (1966).
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TORTS-Malpractice Locality Rule-Specialist held to stand-
ard of skill and care of average member of his profession
practicing the specialty. Brune v. Belinkoff (Mass. 1968).
In New Bedford, Massachusetts (population 100,000), the
defendant, an anesthesiology specialist, had administered a
spinal anesthetic to the plaintiff during childbirth. The dos-
age was eight milligrams of pontocaine in one cubic centi-
meter of diluted glucose, which the defendant testified was
proper. There was also evidence that good medical practice
required a dosage of five milligrams or less. Eleven hours
later, while in her hospital room, the plaintiff attempted to
get out of bed but fell because of numbness in her legs. The
numbness was alleged to have persisted continuously up to
the time of trial.
Eight physicians gave testimony during the trial, and there
was ample evidence that the plaintiff's condition resulted
from an excessive dosage of pontocaine. However, the de-
fendant offered testimony that in administering the anesthetic
he followed the local custom or practice in childbirth cases
in the New Bedford area.1
The trial court charged the jury on Massachusetts law as
follows:
If, in a given case, it were determined by a jury that
the ability and skill of the physician in New Bedford
were fifty percent inferior to that which existed in
Boston, a defendant in New Bedford would be re-
quired to measure up to the standard of skill and
competence and ability that is ordinarily found by
physicians in New Bedford. 2
This instruction was a statement of the locality rule. The
plaintiff made timely exception to the charge but was over-
ruled. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant,
and the plaintiff appealed. The Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, held, reversed and remanded. A specialist must
be held to the standard of care and skill of the average
member of the profession practicing the specialty, except that
the medical resources available in the particular specialist's
1. The defendant testified that the dosages given would vary in Boston,
New York, and New Bedford due to differences in obstetrical technique.
The New Bedford obstetricians use suprafundi pressure (pressure applied
to the uterus during delivery), which requires a high level of anesthesia.
2. 235 N.E.2d at 795.
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community may be taken into account.2 Brune v. Belinkoff,
235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968).
The basis of liability in a malpractice action is negligence,
and negligence is shown on the part of the defendant doctor
if it is proven that he did not meet the standard of skill and
care owed to his patient. There are three general rules fol-
lowed by the various courts in determining the standard of
care and skill required of physicians.4 The oldest rule, and
the rule followed in the majority of jurisdictions, is the "same
locality" or locality rule.5 The locality rule allows a defendant
physician to be compared only with the average member of
the profession practicing in his locality. If the doctor lives
in a small rural community where there are only five prac-
ticing physicians, he will only be held to the standard of care
and skill of the average member of those five physicians.
Therefore, if the strict locality rule is followed, the members
of that profession, in essence, set their own standard of care.
This rule was reasonable in the nineteenth century when
rural physicians were limited in medical supplies and facili-
ties. The rationale of the rule would seem to have been that
it was better to have a physician trained to some extent than
to have none at all.
3. The court stated the rule as follows:
The proper standard is whe e physician, if a general
practitioner, has exercised the degree of care and skill of the
average qualified practitioner, taking into account the advances
in the profession. In applying this standard it is permissible
to consider the medical resources available to the physician as
one circumstance in determining the skill and care required.
Under this standard some allowance is thus made for the te
of community in which the physician carries on his practice.
One holding himself out as a specialist should be held to the
standard of care and skill of the average member of the profes-
sion practising the specialty, taking into account the advances
in the profession. And, as in the case of the general practitioner,
it is permissible to consider the medical resources available to
him.
235 N.E.2d at 798. It is difficult to determine what the court meant by
"one circumstance in determining the skill and care required." Presumably,
the court must determine the standard of care required and so instruct
the jury; "applying this standard" is left to the jury.
4. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 164-68 (3d ed.
1964); 14 STAN. L. REv. 884 (1962).
5. See Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880), in which Massachusetts
adopted the locality rule for determining the standard of care and skill
of a country doctor making surgical repairs to tendons. Massachusetts has
generally followed the locality rule since Small v. Howard. But see Har-
riott v. Plimpton, 166 Mass. 585, 44 N.E.2d 992 (1896) (physician held
to standard of ordinary skill and learning of a physician; no mention made
of locality); Borysewiez v. Dineen, 302 Mass. 461, 19 N.E.2d 540 (1939)
(physician held to standard of skill and care of ordinary person in same
profession in similar circumstances; no mention made of locality).
1968]
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Later the courts began to recognize the narrowness of the
strict locality rule, and some jurisdictions used the term
"similar localities"0 or "similar neighborhood."7  The term
"similar" does not refer to geographic similarities or socio-
economic factors, but instead refers to medical factors." These
medical factors include opportunities for further medical edu-
cation and accessibility to medical facilities. The "similar
locality" rule permits physicians, although practicing in dif-
ferent localities, to be compared in care and skill, provided
the localities are medically similar. This is a reasonable com-
parison because if all medical factors are equal, the standard
of care of physicians should be comparable from one area
to another.
The coming and more modern trend is to consider the
medical profession as a whole in determining the required
skill and care of a physician.9
The three previously mentioned rules refer to general prac-
titioners. The specialist, on the other hand, is required to
possess a higher degree of care and skill than the general
practitioner. The general rule is that the specialist is to be
compared with his fellow specialists generally and no allow-
ance is to be made for locality.10 In Carbone v. Warburton"1
New Jersey established that one who holds himself out as a
specialist must not only use the skill required of a general
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 166-67 (3d ed. 1964);
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv.
549 (1959).
7. Bessinger v. DeLoach, 230 S.C. 1, 94 S.E.2d 3 (1956), in which the
plaintiff sued the defendant dentist for malpractice. The dentist was re-quiredto use reasonable care in the performance of professional serv-
ices and to act according to his best judgment in treating his
patients; but [was] only bound to possess and exercise that de-
gree of skill and learning which is ordinarily possessed and
exercised by members of his profession in good standing in the
same general neighborhood or in similar localities.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, comment (g), in which
an allowance is made for locality, but locality is not made the controlling
factor.
8. Warnock v. Kraft, 30 Cal. App. 2d 1, 85 P.2d 505 (1938), in which
the court ruled, for the purpose of the locality rule, that the cities of Los
Angeles and Pasadena were in the same locality.
9. See note 4 supra.
10. Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Hundley
v. Martinez, 158 S.E. 2d 159 (W. Va. 1967).
11. 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
or TORTS § 299A, comment (g), which provides that a physician who holds
himself out as a specialist in certain types of practice is required to have
the skill and knowledge common to other specialists.
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practitioner but in addition must use the special degree of
skill normally possessed by the average physician who spe-
cializes in treatment of a particular organ, disease, or injury.
The rationale of the rule lies in the fact that specialists con-
centrate their attention in small areas of medicine and are
usually examined and certified by specialty boards. This
tends to make uniform the specialty procedures and practices.
In addition, most hospitals require their various staff spe-
cialists to be certified by their respective specialty board,
which also produces uniformity among hospitals.
In Brune v. Belinkoff the issue was whether or not the
locality rule should apply in determining the standard of skill
and care required of a specialist. The Massachusetts court
had adopted the locality rule in SmaZl v. Howard,12 an 1880
decision. In overruling the Small case, the court enunciated
a general rule to cover both general practitioners and spe-
cialists. The court held that the standard of care and skill
for a specialist was that of the average member of the pro-
fession practicing the specialty, taking into account the ad-
vances in the profession. The court then said that it was
permissible to consider the medical resources available to the
doctor, thereby making some allowance for the local com-
munity where the doctor practices.' 3 Such a rule that avail-
able resources can be considered as one factor, but not the
only factor, is similar to that embodied in the second Restate-
ment of Torts.' 4 In determining whether or not a doctor meets
the required standard, the jury will be able to give some
consideration to the local community, thus making a distinc-
tion between the big city physician and his rural counter-
part. 5 Therefore, the court did not completely abandon the
locality rule.
In arriving at its decision the court surveyed various juris-
dictions and was influenced most by decisions in Minnesota
and Washington. Minnesota ruled that
12. 128 Mass. 131 (1880).
13. See note 3 supra.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, comment (g), in which
an allowance is made for the type of community.
15. The court has left some flexibility in the standard. It would be il-
logical to compare a rural doctor who could not afford expensive equipment
with doctors in a four member office in the city of Boston. On these grounds
the court seems to have retained something of the locality rule in allowing
consideration of medical resources available to the defendant. See note 3
supra.
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[f]requent meetings of medical societies, articles in
the medical journals, books by acknowledged authori-
ties, and extensive experience in hospital work put
the country doctor on more equal terms with his
city brother .... [W]e are unwilling to hold that he
is to be judged only by the qualifications that others
in the same village or similar villages possess.16
In Pederson v. Dumouchel'7 the plaintiff had alleged an
injury from spinal anesthesia. The Washington court said
that locality was one element in determining the standard of
care of a physician in similar circumstances. A year later
a Washington trial court applied the similar locality rule
when it instructed the jury that the defendant doctor should
be held to the standard of an ordinary general practitioner
performing general surgery in a community similar to Ray-
mond, Washington. In reversing the tial court, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court held that the locality rule was reason-
able in frontier days, but in modern times with rapid trans-
portation and communications available, the rule had become
obsolete.1 s The court further pointed out the present avail-
ability of medical seminars and the wide circulation of med-
ical journals and stated that retention of the locality rule
would, in fact, favor the medical profession over other pro-
fessions before the law.
Brune v. Belinkoff has also removed one of the difficulties
encountered by plaintiffs in obtaining competent expert testi-
mony in malpractice cases. If a physician practicing a spe-
ciality is held to a standard of care and skill of that profession
generally, then any competent physician practicing that spe-
cialty could testify to the proper standard of care and skill.
Familiarity with the community would not be the crucial
factor. This would enable plaintiffs to obtain expert testimony
when the defendant lived in a small community and the local
practitioners refuse to testify.
Most physicians practicing a specialty go out of their partic-
ular community to learn their special skills at highly re-
16. Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077, 1081 (1916).
17. 431 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1967).
18. Douglas v. Bussabarger, 438 P.2d 829, 837-38 (Wash. 1968); see
Stiencipher, Survey of Medical Professional Liability in Washington, 39
WASH. L. Rnv. 704, 720-22 (1964).
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spected medical centers. There are ample opportunities for
specialists to keep abreast of new developments in their fields
through their specialty boards, seminars, medical journals,
and more recently, through closed circuit educational tele.
vision. The Massachusetts court, in establishing a reasonable
rule for the required skill and care of specialists, has brought
the Massachusetts law up-to-date with modern times.
GLENN W. THOMASON
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - Notice Requirement -
Oral notice to supervisor held sufficient to comply with notice
statute. Mize v. Sangamo Electric Co. (S.C. 1968).
The claimant injured her back while lifting a bucket of
magnets as part of her job. The claimant's supervisor was
told of the accident later in her shift as he made his regular
rounds. Although the claimant did fail to report the next day
for an extra shift as she had promised, she continued to
work regularly until she was furloughed with several other
employees due to a cut-back in production. The claimant did
not seek medical attention for approximately six weeks; at
this time it was discovered that she was suffering from a
ruptured disc.
On a prior appeal' this case was remanded to the Industrial
Commission which found factually that there was reasonable
excuse for the employee not giving written notice within 30
days and that the employer could not claim prejudice because
it had full notice in fact through a plant supervisor. On ap-
peal, the South Carolina Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Noti-
fication of a plant supervisor, orally and apparently without
manifestation of serious bodily harm, rendered a claimant
free from the statutory obligation to inform the employer in
writing of an accident within 30 days of its occurrence.
Mize v. Sangano Electric Co., 161 S.E.2d 846 (S.C. 1968).
The workmen's compensation statutes are considered re-
medial in nature, and therefore, their terms should be liberally
construed to effectuate their purpose. 2 In light of the purpose
of these statutes, generalizations such as "the benefits . . .
should not be denied upon technical, narrow, and strict inter-
pretation '" 3 seem, at first, reasonable. Other interests must be
considered, however. It is equally important for the claimant
to act within the statutory framework in obtaining the bene-
fits to which he is entitled so that the substantive rights of
the employer will be protected.
The South Carolina Legislature has clearly stated that "no
compensation shall be payable unless . . . written notice is
1. Mize v. Sangamo Elec. Co., 246 S.C. 307, 143 S.E.2d 590 (1965).
2. Strawhorn v. J.A. Chapman Const. Co., 202 S.C. 43, 24 S.E.2d 116
(1943); Buggs v. United States Rubber Co., 201 S.C. 281, 22 S.E.2d 881
(1943).
3. Blassingame v. Southern Asbestos Co., 217 N.C. 223, 233, 7 S.E.2d
478, 484 (1940), citing Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 153
S.E. 591 (1930).
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given [to the employer] within thirty days after the occur-
rence of the accident or death, unless reasonable excuse is
made to the satisfaction of the Commission .... ,4 The In-
dustrial Commission must further be satisfied, before award-
ing benefits, that failure to give notice has not resulted in
prejudice to the employer. 5 The purpose of this requirement
is to afford protection to the employer so that he might in-
vestigate facts and question witnesses while memories are
unfaded and to afford the employer an opportunity to furnish
medical care so as to minimize consequent disability and
liability.6 It has been recognized that the right to notice is
a substantial right and is not to be treated as a mere techni-
cality; the limitations of time must be properly enforced so
that all interests might be protected."
Although the statute requires notice to the employer,
notice may be given instead to a proper representative of
the employer." It is not the notice to this representative
which is sufficient in and of itself, but the knowledge thus
acquired is inputed to the employer regardless of whether or
not the information is actually brought to his attention. The
Supreme Court in Voris v. Eikei9 reasoned that such notice
was sufficient because the failure of the agent to whom notice
is given to convey the information to the employer is attribu-
table to the employer and not the employee.
An understandable exception to the requirement that the
claimant provide written notice, and one contemplated by the
statute, is the circumstance in which the employer has actual
knowledge of the injury, the most obvious example occurring
when the employer witnesses the accident. Actual knowledge
of the employer's representative is also charged to the em-
ployer by imputation. Notice of an accident to be adequate
must, directly or by imputation, put the employer on inquiry
as to all elements of time, place and circumstances of the
4. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72-301 (1962).
5. Id.
6. Ashe v. Rock Hill Hardware Co., 219 S.C. 159, 64 S.E.2d 396 (1951);
Mintz v. Fiske-Carter Const. Co., 218 S.C. 409, 63 S.E.2d 50 (1951).
7. See generally Harpe v. Kline Iron & Metal Works, 219 S.C. 527, 66
S.E.2d 30 (1951) ; Mints v. Fiske-Carter Const. Co., 218 S.C. 409, 63 S.E.2d
50 (1951); Edge v. Dunean Mills, 202 S.C. 189, 24 S.E.2d 268 (1943).
8. 12 W. SCHNEIDE, WoRxnmN's COMPENSATION TEXT § 2360(b)
(1960). Persons who would seem to qualify to receive this notice for the
employer include the employer's managers, supervisors, superintendents,
foremen, first-aid representative or physician.
9. 346 U.S. 328 (1953).
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injury.'0 It is to be noted that knowledge of the injury is to
be distinguished from knowledge of the accident."- Having
had the injury brought to his attention directly or through
his agent, an employer has no valid defense that he has been
prejudiced. South Carolina courts readily accept actual knowl-
edge as reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the writ-
ten notice requirements of section 72-301 of its Workmen's
Compensation Law.' 2
In Mize, no written notice had ever been offered to the em-
ployer, so the determination of qualification for benefits con-
centrated on oral notice given to one Rayford Burdette, su-
pervisor of the claimant at the time of the injury. Due to
the interval of time between the accident and the presentation
of the claim before the Commission, the testimony of both the
claimant and Burdette was sufficiently vague to hinder re-
construction of the exact events of the evening of the accident.
The record shows that the claimant reported for her shift
on Friday, December 14, 1962, and during the early part of
her shift was contacted by Burdette, who asked if she would
work on Saturday, not a regular day for her. She agreed to
do this. Later, during her shift, Mrs. Mize lifted a bucket
of magnets. At this time she felt a pain in her leg and back.
Sufficiently subsequent to the time of the accident for the
leg to become swollen, Burdette visited the claimant's area
again. He was shown the swollen leg, told of the accident,
and was confronted with the possibility that the claimant
might be unable to work her extra shift on Saturday. Bur-
dette assured her that she would be all right, and promised
to keep her on a "sitting down" job. Following a painful,
restless night the claimant phoned her employer that she
would not be at work as promised. Thereafter, the claimant
returned to her regular job, except for holidays, until she
10. See, e.g., Ricker v. Village Management Corp., 231 S.C. 47, 97 S.E.2d
83 (1957).
11. See 12 W. SCHNEIDER, WORMIEN'S COmPENSATION TEXT § 2360 (a)
(1960).
12. Ricker v. Village Management Corp., 231 S.C. 47, 97 S.E.2d 83
(1957); Raley v. City of Camden, 222 S.C. 303, 72 S.E.2d 572 (1952);
Teigue v. Appleton Co., 221 S.C. 52, 68 S.E.2d 878 (1952); Strawhorn v.
J.A. Chapman Const. Co., 202 S.C. 43, 24 S.E.2d 116 (1943). While the
Teigue decision recognizes this excuse for failure to give written notice,
it indicates that the actual knowledge of the employer must have been as
complete as if the employee had rendered written notice. Knowledge of
the injury must be brought home to the employer; knowledge that the
employee became ill while at work, of itself, is insufficient to put the em-
ployer on notice.
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was furloughed on December 28, 1962. On January 25, 1963,
Mrs. Mize sought medical attention for the first time. Upon
entry into the hospital on January 27, 1963, she specifically
denied an injury, but claimed that her condition had had an
insiduous onset. At this time she also said that the condition
had been with her for about three weeks, the time being
separated from the accident by approximately six weeks.
Prior to further analysis of Mize, it should be remembered
that there is no presumption of compensability. The claimant
must establish facts necessary to entitle him to such com-
pensation.'8 In the absence of written notice, the claimant
must establish either a reasonable excuse for the failure to
give notice or actual notice of the employer.
The weaknesses of the majority opinion in the three-to-two
split decision were ably pointed out by Justice Littlejohn. One
of his major attacks on the ruling was aimed at the conclusion
that there was, in fact, actual knowledge to be imputed to
the employer. While finding no fault with the principle that
knowledge of the supervisor will be inputed to the employer,
the dissenting justice was dissatisfied with the sufficiency
of the notice to Burdette, himself. The claimant did not seek
out Burdette, but offered the information only when he came
for a periodic check of the area. The lack of apparent serious-
ness of the incident could further be inferred from her tenta-
tive agreement to come to work on the following day, albeit
on a "sitting down" job. The record indicated no reason why
written notice was never given. Justice Littlejohn concluded
that if the scant oral notice in this case is sufficient, oral
notice in all cases is sufficient, thus defeating the purpose
of the statute.14 He also noted that only six weeks after the
accident the claimant specifically denied any definite history
of injury in speaking to her physician; yet, eight months
after the alleged accident the claimant testified that the ac-
cident was causally connected to her injury.
In summary, the Mize decision will become a byword of
claimants' counsel and will be as the proverbial thorn in the
13. Hines v. Pacific Mills, 214 S.C. 125, 51 S.E.2d 383 (1949), citing
Rudd v. Fairforest Finishing Co., 189 S.C. 188, 200 S.E. 727 (1939).
14. 161 S.E.2d at 852 (dissenting opinion). Justice Littlejohn says that
the majority opinion permits the claimant to disregard the statute and
say: "q did not give written notice because I elected to give oral notice
instead." Id. at 853. Such a result would usurp the function of the leg-
islature.
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flesh of lawyers who represent employers in workmen's com-
pensation procedings. The obvious danger of the decision
lies in the inability of witnesses to make factual determina-
tions relating to remote incidents, the facts of which were not
brought home to the employer while they were fresh in the
minds of witnesses. Mize renders the written notice to em-
ployer portion of section 72-301 of South Carolina's Work-
men's Compensation Law substantually impotent. It is sub-
mitted that the court might have profited from the reasoning
of Buckles v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.15 in which the
Kentucky court realized that workmen's compensation stat-
utes should be construed liberally, but that even such broad
interpretation did not mean disregard of the statute or repeal
of it under the guise of construction.
J. HAMTON STEWART, III
15. 280 Ky. 644, 134 S.W.2d 221 (1939).
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